Deleuze understood Bergson as perhaps the greatest theorist of difference, the theorist whose insistence brought difference into philosophy and showed that philosophy was irresistibly drawn, insofar as it is directed by real questions and problems, those that impinge on us without relief, to that which differs from itself, to that which exists only as becoming. For Bergson, philosophy brings to knowledge that which the sciences must necessarily leave out, the continuities and connections that the sciences cannot see in their focus on closed systems and definable and isolatable terms. He articulates that which the arts express more directly than the sciences but can articulate only through an absolute and ungeneralizable singularity: the continuity of the real, the immersion of life and matter in the real, the force and effect of duration. Neither science nor art can simultaneously grasp both the relentless universal force of difference, and its absolute specificity: as each touches upon one it elides the other. Philosophy functions somewhere ‘between’ these approaches, seeking the two-faced movement of universalization and particularity, of generalization and individuation, through that which unites them: the dual force of duration, the double generation of the past and the present, the virtual and the actual, which is the movement of difference.

I explore here four key concepts in Bergson’s writings – difference, duration, intuition and becoming – and their place in Deleuze’s understanding of philosophy as the invention and exploration of concepts produced through an encounter with the force of the real. In its ‘proper’ mode, when it is directed through a methodology that will provide it with the means for producing concepts, when it is oriented to well-formulated questions, philosophy is drawn to the question of difference, that is, to the immersion of difference in and the production of difference by duration. Duration is difference, the inevitable force of differentiation and elaboration, which is also another name for becoming. Becoming is the operation of self-differentiation, the elaboration of a difference within a thing, a quality or a system that emerges or actualizes only in duration. Duration is the ‘field’ in which difference lives and plays itself out. Duration is that which undoes as well as what makes: to the extent that duration entails an open future, it involves the fracturing and opening up of the past and the present to what is virtual in them, to what in them differs from the actual, to what in them can bring forth the new. This unbecoming is the very motor of becoming, making the past and present
not given but fundamentally ever-altering, virtual. Intuition is the precise method of discernment available to philosophy in its exploration of these durational becomings.

**Difference**

Deleuze has three texts specifically devoted to Bergson’s philosophy. While difference is a concept that seems to preoccupy his writings, it is the primary focus of these three texts. Deleuzian difference is Bergsonian. Although his position has been commonly confused with Derrida’s and Lyotard’s, there are a number of crucial differences between Deleuze’s understanding, and that of his postmodern contemporaries. It also may account for the difficulty that many feminists have had in adapting or developing Deleuze’s understanding of difference for an analysis of sexual difference – his account is not linked to binarized structures of the kind feminists have analyzed as oppressive to the female or feminine term, although he and Guattari have addressed how ‘becoming-woman’ may be a politically necessary path in the development of new concepts of man and woman. Rather, it is addressed to the ontological ground that prefigures and makes possible relations between subjects, and between subjects and objects.

Difference has tended to be conceived in one of two ways over the last century. Either it has been construed as comparative, an external difference between complete entities which can be measured or represented according to a third or extrinsic term, a metric which determines relations of more or less; or it has been understood as constitutive, an internal relation of terms which structures them according to their negative relation to other terms. Egalitarian feminism, which seeks to provide women with positions equal to and directly comparable with men, to represent women in terms of their sameness or equivalence to men, provides a striking confirmation of the first understanding of difference: there are two given entities – men and women – which can be compared and evaluated in terms of some ideal of the human. Projects for equalization of rights and responsibilities between the two sexes requires and calls on some conception of ‘human dignity,’ ‘human rights,’ by which equality can be measured or charted. ‘Feminisms of difference,’ usually associated with the writings of French feminists, can serve as examples of the second understanding of difference, where men and women are no longer understood as given separate entities but terms which require each other, functioning diacritically. Woman is not-man, and lacks the characteristics that define man. For feminists of difference, the political problem with such an understanding of difference is that the terms are not reversible and their relation is not reciprocal. Man is not the negation of woman; only woman is defined negatively in patriarchal cultures. Difference, the potential for a reciprocal relation between terms, is reduced to opposition, though it remains virtual within oppositions. What both conceptions of difference share is an understanding of difference as a relation of two terms, whether construed as external to each other, or as internal to an entity, which entails an implicit or third term. The debate on the status and nature of difference has tended to see it as a struggle of two terms, pairs; a struggle to equalize two terms in the one case, and a struggle to render the two terms reciprocal and interchangeable in the other.
Deleuze’s project is different. Difference is not a concept bound up with units, entities, or terms. It characterizes fields, and indeed reality itself. Difference is an ontological rather than a logical, semiological, political or historical category. It is a relation between fields, strata and chaos. It is a movement beyond dualism, beyond pairs, entities or terms. Difference is the methodology of life, and, indeed, of the universe itself. Things in their specificity and generality, and not just terms, are the effects of difference, though difference is not reducible to things insofar as it is the process that produces things and the reservoir from which they derive.

Bergson resolves these two conceptions of difference by developing a model that includes them both while filling in their intermediary or transitional links. He is concerned both with external differences that constitute different things and render them amenable to comparison, which he construes as differences of nature; and with constitutive or internal differences that explain and produce these differences of nature without themselves having a nature other than their own differing. We find differences of nature in the world, through empirical investigation, but we find internal differences directly only within ourselves and our immersion in duration. These differences, between differences in kind and differences of degree, cannot be understood as differences in nature, as external to each other for, as Bergson makes clear, different things, differences in nature turn out, in the end, to be merely the modes of expansion or actualization of internal difference: they turn out to be the lowest degree, the slowing down, of differences of degree. And in turn, differences of degree can be seen as the acceleration and expansion of differences in nature or kind. Each becomes the slower or faster, compression or dilation of one and the same pulsating unbecoming.

It is no longer a question of ‘undoing’ binary terms even temporarily, of freeing up the subordinated term in an oppositional or dualistic structure, for dualisms cannot be resolved either through monism, which involves the reduction of the two terms to one, or through the addition of extra terms – as if three or four terms would somehow overcome the constraint of the two (or the one, for the two binary terms are commonly translatable into a single term and its negation). It is only the proliferation of dualisms, and their capacity for infinite reversal that reveals the stratum, the field on which they are grounded, which is the real object of both Deleuze’s and Bergson’s explorations. Underlying the dualistic structure by which difference has come to be represented is a fundamental continuum, a movement of degrees, a movement of differentiation that elaborates a multiplicity of things according to a unity of impulse or force.

Dualisms, relations of binary opposition, in fact do not involve two terms at all, but two tendencies or impulses, only one of which is the ground of the other, the force which, in elaborating or differentiating itself, generates a term (or many) that maps, solidifies and orders this ground according to its terms. The ground – in Bergson, duration, in Deleuze, the strata or planes erected by thought and action – generates those impulses that reveal themselves as things, objects, matter, that which is opposed to duration or functions as its other. While matter presents itself as the other or opposite of duration, it also attempts to colonize and contain duration in its spatializing impulses, to make duration over into a form of spatialization, which is to say, stabilization; yet matter, in spite of its scientific reduction to closed systems operating according to predictable laws, also carries, as it were in secret, duration, flux.
As a whole, as undivided, as open, the material universe is also duration, although when divided and rendered analyzable, it presents itself as the other, the opposite of duration. Matter is duration at its most dilated, as life, to which matter is commonly opposed, is duration as it is experienced, in its varying degrees or qualities of expansion or contraction. Life is the protraction of matter, as matter is the contraction of life. Mind and matter, life and matter, rather than binary terms, are different degrees of duration, different tensions, modes of relaxation or contraction, neither opposed nor continuous – different nuances, different actualizations of one and the same, that is, ever differing, internally and eternally differing, duration.

In Bergson, difference has four facets, four activities or forces, which other more deconstructively oriented conceptions of difference seem to ignore:

1. difference presents itself as differences of nature; as such it is the object of empirical intuition, the investigation of specific and irreducible differences, natural articulations of the real, the ways in which the real divides itself (rather than is divided by us) in its elaboration;
2. it functions through a force of internal difference; as such it in the internal dynamic of open-endedness, ensuring that not only does it differ from itself, or become, it also differs from everything ‘like’ it, everything with which it shares a species or category, a resemblance. Thus species, or categories, modes of resemblance, have their own inner dynamic, or ‘tendency’, a difference in nature;
3. it operates or acts through degrees of difference; which entails that not only are terms differentiated, but they are also linked through their different degrees of actualization to tendencies and processes that are present everywhere but expressed or actualized only in particular degrees (of contraction/dilation);
4. and its movement must always be understood as a process of differentiation, division or bifurcation.

Difference is not the union of the two sexes, the overcoming of racial and other differences through the creation or production of a universal term by which they can be equalized or neutralized, but the generation of ever-more variation or differentiation. Difference generates further difference because difference inheres the force of duration (becoming/unbecoming) in all things, in all acts of differentiation and in all things and terms thus differentiated.

Intuition

Bergson’s philosophical method, intuition, has very little in common with how this term is commonly understood, as a vague empathy or feeling. There is nothing impulsive or vague about intuition, which is a rigorous philosophical method for an attunement with the concrete specificities of the real. Intuition is the method by which unique and original concepts are created and developed for objects, qualities and durations that are themselves unique and specific. Intuition is, for Bergson, a relatively rare but ever-productive force in the history of philosophy: it occurs only when old and familiar methods by which intelligence always seeks to address the present and the new exhaust themselves and provide only generalizations rather than a concept uniquely
sui ted to its object. An intuition is a remarkably simple ‘concept,’ whose economy and unity is belied by the (philosophical) language that expresses it. More a ‘shadow,’ a ‘swirling of dust’ than a concrete and well-formed concept, intuition is an emergent and imprecise movement of simplicity that erupts by negating the old, resisting the temptations of intellect to understand the new in terms of the language and concepts of the old (and thus the durational in terms of the spatial). This eruption of intuition, as rare as it is, marks the history of philosophy, much as Kuhn (1970) understands that the paradigm shift continually marks and remakes the history of science. Bergson understands analysis, which science most commonly utilizes as its method, as what decomposes an object into what is already known, what an object shares with others, a categorical rather than an individuating mode of knowledge. Intuition, by contrast is that mode of (internal) transport into the heart of a thing such that it suits that thing alone, its particularity in all its details. Intuition is a mode of ‘sympathy’ by which every characteristic of an object (process, quality etc.) is brought together, none is left out, in a simple and immediate resonance of life’s inner duration and the absolute specificity of its objects. It is an attuned empiricism that does not reduce its components and parts but expands them to connect this object to the very universe itself.

Intuition has two tendencies that blur into each other, exhibiting the same fusional continuum that marks differences in nature and differences of degree. The first is a tendency downward, inside, into a depth beyond practical utility, available to us at those moments of reflection when we can perceive our own inner continuity above and beyond action and definable results. The second is a reverse movement, in which this downward tendency sees in itself, in the depths of its own self-immersion, the durational flow that also characterizes the very surface of objects in their real relations with each other. If one reaches deeply enough, one finds a continuity with the surface, one rebounds directly to things in their immediacy:

Let us then go down into our own inner selves: the deeper the point we touch, the stronger will be the thrust which sends us back to the surface. Philosophical intuition is this contact, philosophy this impetus. Brought back to the surface by an impulsion from the depth, we shall regain contact with science as our thought opens out and disperses.

This return movement is the direct contact of the living with the material, duration with space, the movement whereby the one compresses itself as the other: the object touches the subject, mind partakes of and as matter, the subject is immersed in and as an object and matter is made conceptual, rendered virtual: but only at those moments when intuition, as difficult as it is to muster, erupts. It can only occur, Bergson suggests, because our own inner life, the continuity of consciousness, reveals to us varieties of qualitative difference, the continuous forward movement of temporality and a unity and simplicity of direction which can only be discerned retrospectively. This inner continuity, to which all living beings have direct access in varying degrees, is that through which they can access the outer continuity of matter and the world of objects, through which a different kind of knowledge is possible.

Bergson is the first to admit, along with Deleuze, that philosophers are not the only ‘professionals’ of intuition: this philosophy shares with those moments of rupture and
emergence that also characterize the sciences and the arts. Yet while scientists, with some exceptions, are loathe to admit an extra-rational sympathetic intuition guiding their methodologies, Bergson and Deleuze commonly refer to art and the activities of artists as giving a clearer expression to this intuitive impulse. This immersion into the continuity of being without containment is the very condition of art, which nonetheless, while harnessing or expressing this continuity, cannot unambiguously communicate it.

Adding to science and its intuitive intimations and creative leaps, philosophy provides the continuities and connections between things and systems that science must ignore in order to focus on measurable and utilizable data. It also adds to the non-functional perceptual immersion in things and qualities that art generates, a language, a set of concepts that makes the real communicable and able to link with and augment the ultimately pragmatic focus of the sciences. While lying in some senses ‘between’ art and science, philosophical intuition is nevertheless its own unique discipline, the activity or tendency directed to the discernment of duration and its movements of continuity and discontinuity, becoming and unbecoming. Intuition is the method for the discernment of differences: it is difference’s most attuned and direct expression, its ‘joy.’

Intuition is not simply the discernment of natural differences, qualitative differences or differences in kind; it is the inner orientation to tendency, to the differences between tendencies. It is the capacity to understand natural differences beyond a monistic or dualistic model, not as a relation of two terms, but as the convergence of two tendencies or dispositions, not marked by negation but brought together through contraction/dilation.

Deleuze, following Bergson, proliferates dualisms, not because the world or the real is readily divisible into binarized pairs but because each of these pairs – mind and matter, space and duration, differences in nature and differences of degree, intelligence and intuition, territorialization and deterritorialization, man and woman and so on – is the expression of a single force (not, as Badiou suggests, the univocity of being, but its diversity and plurality as becoming) that is best expressed by one of these terms, the one most commonly suppressed by rational thought in its self-development, the one that nevertheless conceptually underpins the other. This one term – duration, mind (or memory), differences of degree, deterritorialization, woman/the maternal etc. – is not that to which the other is reducible, but is the underlying principle or condition of the other, its secret depth or complication.

Intuition is an attempt within philosophy to restore to philosophy those multiplicitous links and connections that this simplification brings to its understanding of the real, to restore the complexity of undecidability to the real. It reveals and makes explicit the fine threads within and between objects (including living beings) that always makes them more than themselves, always propels them in a mode of becoming. What intuition gives back to the real is precisely that virtuality which complicates the actual, that depth of duration that undergirds the surface of things. It acknowledges the real’s capacity to be otherwise, its ability to become more and other.
Becoming/Unbecoming

Bergson’s project can be understood to be the transformation of the concept of being through the generation of an ontology of becoming, of the actual in terms of the elaboration of the virtual, and of intelligence through the intervention of intuition. These are three expressions of one and the same programme – the replacement of static conceptions of things through the creation of dynamic conceptions of processes in continual transition. Deleuze’s attraction to Bergsonism lies in precisely Bergson’s undermining of the stability of fixed objects and states and his affirmation of the vibratory continuity of the material universe as a whole, that is, in his developing a philosophy of movement and change.

Durational force, the force of temporality is the movement of complication, dispersion or difference that makes any becoming possible and the world a site of endless and unchartable becomings. Life expresses becoming through the dual processes of species evolution (at the level of the group or category) and development and aging (at the level of the individual); but equally matter itself, the world of objects, must itself become other than itself in order for it to be capable of engendering and sustaining life. Life (mind, memory, consciousness in varying degrees) is inserted into the world of material objects only to the extent that it partakes of them and can utilize them for its own purposes: both at its surface, through perception and in its depth, through intuition, life brushes up against matter as its inner core. But matter must also be capable of housing the aspirations that life imposes on it: it must be capable of becoming more and other than what it is (at any one time) in order for life to emerge or evolve in the first place, and for life to be able to induce the expression of matter’s virtuality, which is to say, its capacity for being otherwise, its capacity or potential for becoming/unbecoming. If the tendency of matter is to remain closed to its virtuality, to remain self-identical, that is because it contains in itself an inherent openness that links it to the whole of the material universe.

Each thing is a part of the whole whose origin in the (durational) material whole marks it with duration or becoming as its principle of differentiation. Each thing can become otherwise, even if its present being can be calculated and measured quite precisely. By virtue of its inherence in the whole of matter, each object is more than itself, contains within itself the material potential to be otherwise and to link and create a continuity with the durational whole that marks each living being. Becoming is thus not a capacity inherited by life, an evolutionary outcome or consequence, but is the very principle of matter itself, with its possibilities of linkage with the living, with its possibilities of mutual transformation, with its inherent and unstable volatility.

For Bergson, life overcomes itself through the activities it performs on objects and itself: it becomes, both over the long-term time scale of evolutionary transformation and adaptation and the short-time time scale of an individual life, something other than its (species or individual) past while retaining a certain continuity with it. Its becomings are contingent only on its capacity to link with, to utilize, and transform, that is, to unbecome, the apparent givenness and inertia of material objects and to give to these objects new virtualities, new impulses and potentials. It needs to unbecome, to undo its actuality as fixed givenness in order for its virtualities to be capable of a new or
different elaboration. As Deleuze and Guattari affirm, this is a co-evolution, not simply in the Darwinian sense of mutual or symbiotic development of species that share the same or related environments, but in the sense of a symbiosis between the living and the non-living. It is because the non-living contains in itself the virtualities required to undertake the becomings its external transformation (by the living) entails, that life carries becoming as its core. It is because life is parasitic on matter that life carries within itself the whole that matter also expresses. It is because life is contingent on harnessing materiality that it is forced to encounter what opposes it and is capable of undoing what it has been and is in order to become more and other.

Bergson understands life, not as a repetition of matter so much as a reply to it. For him, the varieties of species is an acknowledgement of the virtualities life had within itself from the first, qualities of becoming and transformation that govern life from the 'beginning': each species and individual is a corporeal response to a problem the environment poses of how to extract from it the resources needed for life to sustain and transform itself. The becoming of life is the unbecoming of matter, which is not its transformation into (inert) being, but its placement in a different trajectory of becoming. Life intervenes into matter to give it a different virtuality than that through which matter initially generated the possibilities of life. Life recapitulates matter’s durational dynamism, by becoming in all directions available to it, that is, in differing as much as possible in its co-evolution with matter: life brings new virtuality to matter which already harboured in itself the impetus of becoming.

The Real

Deleuze seeks an understanding of the real that is based on two principles: the real is positive, full, has no lack or negation, except through its own positive capacity for self-enfolding; and the real is dynamic, open-ended, ever-changing, giving the impression of stasis and fixity only through the artificial isolation of systems, entities or states. His abiding concern remains with the real, with defining and refining being or reality so that its difference from itself, its fundamental structure of becoming or self-divergence – which may also be understood as an unbecoming – is impossible to ignore. A real that lacks nothing, that is fully positive, that functions as a whole; and a real that changes, that generates the new, that continues becoming, even as it un-becomes earlier becomings. In short, Deleuze seeks a real that is intimately linked to the dynamism of temporality itself.

Bergson attributes to the universe as a whole a durational power that both enables all objects, things, to be synchronized, that is, temporally mapped relative to each other, divisible into different fluxes while nevertheless capable of participating in a single, englobing current forward. The real here is understood as durational: it is composed of millions even billions of specific durations, each with its own measure, its own span. Yet each duration can be linked to the others only because each partakes in the whole of duration and carries in it durational flow, that is, an irresistible orientation forward and an impulse to complexify in this movement. It is because the real is construed as fundamentally dynamic, complex, open-ended, because becoming, which is to say, difference, must be attributed to it in every element that it cannot begin to become, it
does not acquire virtuality but is always in flux. There never was the self-identity and stasis necessary for a fixed identity, a given boundary and clear-cut states, that is, for objects as they are conceptually understood, except that cut out for us by our bodily and perceptual needs.

Like Bergson, Deleuze devoted a career to the analysis and intuition of becomings, of differences; and like Bergson he sought to understand cultural and biological becomings through the creation of an ontology that privileges temporal movement over substance and self-identity. His Bergsonism has led him to understand philosophy, and particularly its ontological orientation, as that which addresses what practical reason, in the form of scientific knowledge, and aesthetics, the intensification of sensation and affect, must leave out even as they utilize its force: the continuity of the real given by durational becoming, the relentless movement forward that cannot be arrested but can only be organized and structured, instrumentalized, by pragmatic concerns. Philosophy is not the contemplation of or reflection on this timeless structure of never-ceasing change, it is the letting loose, the freeing up and putting into play of those conceptual and pragmatic constraints that rigidify scientific forms of knowing, and that are harnessed yet contained in the frame, the boundary required for the work of art.

Philosophy is the mobilization of the force of difference where immobility and the static dominate thought; it is the freeing up of becoming from any determinate direction, the seizing of provisional becomings from the chaos of being. It is the becoming-artistic of scientific knowledge and the becoming-scientific of artistic creation, the creation of something new, not through sensation or affect, but through concepts that draw on the same source, durational self-differing (which Deleuze understands as the whole), that makes the sciences and the arts possible but limits each to its proper place. Philosophy is an undoing, unbecoming, of this proper place, the unhinging of place and space itself, a return to the fluxes of becoming that constitute the real. Philosophy is restored, not as conceptual master of the real, but as that labour of undoing and redoing, unbecoming and becoming, that approaches the real with increasing complexity, tailoring concepts that more adequately fit the real. Philosophy, to transform Deleuze’s aphorism, is the joy of concepts, the intensification of affect and percept, the augmentation and transformation of what science knows, and what art makes.

Notes

2 As Deleuze says ‘The notion of difference promises to throw light on the philosophy of Bergson and inversely, Bergsonism promises to make an inestimable contribution to a philosophy of difference’ Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands, p.32.
3 They are the two short papers, originally published in 1956, gathered together in Desert Islands (‘Bergson, 1859–1941’; and ‘Bergson’s Conception of Difference’); and his full-length study Bergsonism [1966], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone, 1989).
4 I have in mind here, not only Derrida and Lyotard, but also Irigaray and Kristeva, whose conceptions of difference, including sexual difference, must be closely allied with Derrideanism and his critique of binary structures.
6 While many feminists, such as Alice Jardine, in Genesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), Rosi Braidotti, in Patterns of Dissonance (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), and even Irigaray herself believed Deleuze deflected

7 Deleuze, *Desert Islands*, pp.26–27.
8 Deleuze, *Desert Islands*, pp.45–47.


12 Deleuze understands this dual movement from one side as a double foundation, and from the other, as a founding repetition. See Deleuze, *Desert Islands*, pp.23–24.
